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Abstract 
Drinking water for human health and well-being is crucial. Accidental and intentional water 
contamination can pose great danger to consumers. Optimal design of a system that can 
quickly detect the presence of contamination in a water distribution network is very 
challenging for technical and operational reasons. However, on the one hand improvement in 
chemical and biological sensor technology has created the possibility of designing efficient 
contamination detection systems. On the other hand, methods and tools from complex 
network theory, which was primarily the domain of mathematicians and physicists, provide 
analytical output for engineers to design, optimize, operate, and maintain complex network 
systems such as power grids, water distribution networks, telecommunication systems, 
internet, roads, supply chains, traffic and transportation systems. 
In this work, we develop a new modeling approach for the optimal placement of sensors for 
contamination detection in a water distribution network. The approach originally combines 
classical optimization and complex systems theory. 
Keywords:  
Complex networks, water distribution network, optimal location problem, contamination 
warning sensors. 
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Drinking water is a physical, cultural, social, political and economic resource, crucial for 
human health and well-being. Safe supply of potable water is a basic necessity of mankind in 
the industrialized society; therefore, water supply systems are a most important public utility 
[1].Water Distribution Network (WDN) is a network of interconnected pipes and other 
appliances through which water is conveyed, stored intermittently and pumped where 
necessary in order to meet the demand and pressure requirements of the system. A WDN is a 
large, spatially distributed, complex infrastructure, where the possibility of human 
interference is high. In general, water distribution systems can be divided into four main 
components: (1) water sources and intake works, (2) treatment works and storage, (3) 
transmission mains, and (4) distribution network [1]. Accidental and intentional water 
contamination can be of great danger to consumers. Spread of contaminated water in 
Milwaukee, US, in 1993 affected more than 400,000 people, when a microorganism was 
transported through the distribution system [2]. An outbreak of water-borne disease 
epidemics in Walkerton, Ontario, Canada, in the year 2000 affected 2,300 people, as a result 
of exposure to contaminated drinking water [3]. The challenge to designing a monitoring 
system of a limited number of sensors to detect accidental or intentional contaminant 
intrusion events in a WDN has attracted significant attention in recent years. Rathi and Gupta 
in [4] classified the methodologies for sensor placement into two categories, addressing 
single objective and multi-objective sensor location problems. The models and methods 
proposed by different researches to solve these problems are quite varied [5]. 
A WDN is a complex network. Complex networks are defined as systems whose structure is 
irregular, distributed, complex and dynamically evolving in time. In such networks, structure 
affects function [6]. Historically, the study of complex networks has been mainly the domain 
of graph theory, which was introduced by Leonhard Euler in 1736 [7]. Random graph [8], 
Small World [9] and, Scale Free [10] models have been developed to describe different 
network structures. 
In the last decades, the study of complex networks has grown rapidly and has attracted many 
researchers from different academic disciplines and application fields like, for example, in 
power grids [11]–[14], transportation networks [15]–[18], and water distribution networks 
[19]–[21]. 
The aim of the paper is to present a new modeling approach for the optimal placement of 
sensors for contamination warning in a WDN. This problem has been investigated by the 
operational research community as a single and bi-objective optimization problem [22]–[27]. 
Also design, operation and maintenance of WDNs have recently been investigated from a 
complex network theory perspective [28]–[31]. In this paper we combine classical 
optimization and complex network theory in an innovative way. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some minimum background 
on complex network theory. Section 3 presents the work in terms of assumptions and 
scenario planning, problem formulation and solution method. In Section 4, we introduce a 
well-known WDN as case study. Then, we present the results obtained by applying the 
proposed optimization model to the case study WDN in Section 5. Finally, conclusions and 
future research steps are drawn in Section 6. 
2. Complex network 
There are many complex networks in nature, society and technology which are comprised of 
multiple components joined by various types of interconnections and links: for example, 
social networks consisting of people and their contacts, the World Wide Web as an 
information network consisting of the web pages and links among them, and technological 
networks such as the Internet comprised of the computers and physical connections among 
them [32]. Design, operation and maintenance of WDNs have recently been explored by few 
researchers using the complex network approach. 
Yazdani and Jeffrey [33], for the first time, represented a WDN as a large sparse planar graph 
with complex network characteristics and evaluated the topological features and resilience of 
the network. They proposed two metrics of meshed-ness and algebraic connectivity for 
quantification of redundancy and robustness, respectively, which could be used in 
optimization design models [28]. They also used empirical data from benchmark networks to 
study the interplay between network structure and operational efficiency, reliability, and 
robustness [34]. Further, they modeled WDNs as weighted and directed graphs by using the 
physical and hydraulic attributes of system components, and proposed a new measure of 
component criticality, the demand-adjusted entropic degree, to support identification of 
critical nodes and their ranking according to failure impacts [29]. Yazdani et al. [19], also 
proposed four strategies (branched, looped, extra-looped and perfect-mesh) for WDN 
expansion aimed at securing and promoting structural invulnerability subject to design and 
budget constraints, considering a developing country case study.  
Gutiérrez-Pérez et al. [30], [35], introduced spectral measures to establish vulnerability areas 
in WDNs and proposed an index for generating a topological importance measure to form 
clusters in a WDN. Hawick [36], applied graph theory to some synthetic and real WDNs and 
studied the robustness and fragmentation properties through simulated component failure. 
Sheng et al. [31], explored the formation of isolated communities in WDNs based on 
complex network theory. Shuang et al. [20], evaluated the nodal vulnerability of WDNs 
under cascading failures. 
 
2.1. Characterization of a complex network 
A complex network is often represented as a directed (or undirected), weighted (or 
unweighted) graph G = (N, L), with N a set of nodes representing the dynamical units and L a 
set of edges representing the interactions between them. A binary graph can be completely 
described by its adjacency (or connectivity) matrix A, an N ×N square matrix whose entry aij 
(i, j =1, . . , N) is equal to 1 when the link lij exists, and 0, otherwise [14]. 
A graph of a complex network is characterized and quantified by some metrics measuring the 
topological and dynamical properties of the network. Such metrics are important in 
understanding the network complexity and are instrumentals for the design, operation and 
maintenance of complex networks in practice. Here, we list eight metrics in Table 1 and 
illustrate their use for analyzing the graphs of five WDNs. 
 
Table 1. Basic network metrics [13], [14] 
Metrics Description Formula 
Maximum 
degree 
Degree ki is defined for node i as the number of links 
connected to the node. Then, kmax is the maximum number 
of connections to a node in a network. 
kmax= max{ki, for iN} 
Mean degree Average degree of all nodes in a network. 
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Mean 
shortest path 
length 
Average of all shortest paths in a network. N is the size of 
the network and dij  is the length of  the shortest path from 
node i to node j. 
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Clustering 
coefficient 
The quantity ci is the local clustering coefficient of node i , 
expressing how the neighbors of two adjacent nodes have a 
link in between. Here, ei is the actual number of and C is the 
average clustering coefficient. 
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Diameter Graph diameter is the maximum value of shortest paths 
between all nodes. 
 max ,ijd i j Gd    
Critical 
fraction 
The fraction of nodes to be eliminated to render a graph 
unable to percolate, i.e., to go from one node to another 
following an edge. 
fc 
Betweenness 
centrality 
A node is central if it structurally lies between many other 
nodes, in the sense that it is traversed by many of the 
shortest paths connecting pairs of nodes. Here,     is the 
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number of shortest paths from node k to node j ,    ( ) is the 
number of shortest paths that contain i and        . 
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Closeness 
centrality 
The central nodes are those which on average need fewer 
steps to communicate with the others (and not just the first 
neighbors). Here,     is the shortest path from node i to node 
j and          
    
   
∑       
 
 
In Figures 1 and 3, five different WDNs are shown. In Figure 1, we show WDNs for 
EastMersea, Colorado Springs, Richmond and Kumasi [37], and in Figure 3 we show the 
fifth WDN, i.e., the BWSN which we consider in details in Section 4 where we discuss our 
case study. 
 
Figure 1. Four sample WDNs [37] EastMersea (up left), Colorado Springs (up right), 
Richmond (down left), Kumasi (down right) 
 
Table 2 reports the values of the numerical metrics for these five WDNs. From these results, 
it become clear that some metrics are not changing from one WDN to another, e.g., Kmax , 
<k>, because of the physical limitations of WDNs. For example, in any node or junction of a 
WDN we will not have more than 4 connections. Hence, such metrics are not useful in 
differentiating between different WDNs. On the contrary, other metrics in Table 2 vary from 
one network to another and, hence, can be used to differentiate between WDNs. For example, 
we use the values of ki, bi and cli that represent node degree, node betweenness and node 
closeness, respectively, to find out the most important nodes in the network and place sensors 
accordingly, as will be shown later (Figure 6). Note that in Table 2 we have reported the 
mean values for ki, bi and cli as <k>, b and cl, for the five metrics considered. 
We now move on to Section 3, where we develop our new modeling approach by which 
complex network theory and classical optimization theory are integrated to solve sensor 
placement problems in WDNs. 
Table 2. Complex network properties of five WDNs 
Network N L Kmax <k> L Cb d fc b Cl 
East-
Mersea 
755 769 
4 
2.04 34.48 0.36 97 0.22 0.00019 0.039 
Colorado 
Springs 
1786 1994 
4 
2.23 25.94 0.42 69 0.42 0.00024 0.028 
Kumasi 2799 3065 4 2.19 33.89 0.45 120 0.37 0.00009 0.009 
Richmond 872 957 4 2.19 51.44 0.56 135 0.32 0.00006 0.072 
BWSN 129 178 4 2.54 10.15 0.85 25 0.42 0.00750 0.041 
 
3. Methodology 
Selecting sensor locations for minimizing the impact from a set of plausible contamination 
incidents is a problem conceptually equivalent to the well-known problem of facility location 
[38]. This can be framed as the p facility location problem, in which p facilities must be 
located in such a way that the distance from each facility to its customers is minimized. The 
classic p facility location problem can formally be stated as follows. Consider the layout of a 
city, and imagine that p fire stations must be located in order to best serve the city’s residents 
and infrastructure. Each house and building in the city is a customer, and each fire station a 
facility. Given a proposed set of locations, the problem objective is to minimize the average 
distance from a customer to the nearest fire station facility [39]. 
For the drinking water sensor placement problem, the sensors are considered as facilities like 
fire stations in the example above. Each contamination incident is a single “customer.” A 
contamination incident propagates contaminated water through the network and is “served” 
from the network users’ point of view, by the first sensor facility that detects the 
contamination. 
The physical structure of a water distribution system is a network in which nodes represent 
water sources, tanks, and junctions (the connection between pipes and points of water 
withdrawal) and edges represent pipes, valves, and pumps. Contamination events are 
assumed to result only from contaminants introduced at system nodes. We also assume that 
the hydraulic behavior of a water distribution system is not substantially changed by the 
intentional injection of a contaminant [39] and that sensors are perfect (i.e., fully reliable), 
meaning that they can detect contaminants of any concentration with no false negatives and 
false positives. 
Water flows from sources to consumers, possibly transporting contaminants if present in the 
water. Sensors can only detect contamination events that occur upstream from their location. 
Given a budget-constrained number of sensors, it is generally impossible to detect every 
possible contamination event in a water distribution network. Alternatively seen, we wish to 
identify as many of the contamination events as possible, with the budget-limited number of 
sensors available. Without knowing the distribution of contamination events across a water 
distribution network, we generally assume that every node has an equal chance of acting as 
the contamination origin [39]. 
Scenario planning is often used to represent the uncertainty of the future in business and 
governmental policy analysis, and in technological evaluation and development [40]. In our 
research, we use scenario planning to structure the uncertainty inherent in a contamination 
event. A contamination event will occur as one scenario from a large set of scenarios. The set 
of scenarios considered should be representative of the possible realizations of uncertain 
parameters in the problem. 
A set of scenarios is represented as  ( , , ) | ; ;pt d N t T d D N N   , with each scenario 
starting from time t, at any of the N nodes and, lasting a duration d, where Tp is the set of 
discrete event times, D is the set of contamination durations and N is the node set. The 
starting time could be any within a chosen period. The duration of the contamination event 
could range from a few seconds to several days, or even longer if not detected timely. The 
upper limit of the event duration is set to be the required detection time. For instance, if a 
contamination event is required to be detected within two hours from its onset, then the 
longest contamination duration considered is two hours. For the accidental contamination 
event, in absence of additional knowledge it is assumed that contamination events may occur 
at any node with equal probability [39]. 
 
3.1. Problem formulation 
In a conventional design of WDN the following mathematical model is often used [41]: 
min
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(1) 
In which TC is the total cost, Dp is the diameter of pipe p, Lp is the length of pipe p, Qni is the 
inflow into node n, Qnj is the outflow from node n, Dn is the water demand on node n, Sn is 
the reserved capacity at node n, pH  is the head loss on pipe p, n
H  is the head on node n, 
min
nH  is the minimum head required on the node, P is the total number of pipes in the 
network, N is the total number of nodes and L the is total number of loops in the network. In 
this model, the first constraint set is the law of mass conservation as shown in Figure 2 
(right), the second set of constraints are the law of energy conservation as shown in Figure 2 
(left), and the third set of constraints define the minimum head requirements. 
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Figure 2. Conservation laws of mass (right) and energy (left) [41] 
 
Now, we have to turn the hydraulic-based design optimization problem of a WDN presented 
above into a sensor placement optimization problem. This is the way for the classical 
approach to solving sensor placement optimization problems. Rathi and Gupta in [4] 
classified the methodologies on sensor placement into two categories, with reference to 
single-objective and multi-objective sensor location problems. The objectives function 
considered were: (1) early detection of contamination, e.g. minimum (or expected) time to 
detection (TD) [22], [42], [43], (2) minimizing the impact or consequences of contamination, 
e.g. minimum (or expected) volume of water consumed (VC) [23], [44], population exposed 
to contamination (PE) [24], [45], [46], and extent of contamination (EC) [25], [47], (3) 
covering as much as possible the population with limited number of sensors considering (i) 
minimizing risk (Risk) [48] and/or (ii) maximizing detection likelihood (DL) of 
contamination events [26], (4) minimization of sensor response time (SRT) [27], (5) 
minimization of the number of failed detections (NFD)/probability of failed detection (PFD) 
[49] and sensor detection redundancy (SDR) [50], [51]. Ostfeld et al. [5] compared the 
solutions provided by several algorithms based on four objectives: TD, PE, VC and DL, and 
concluded that the solutions provided by different algorithms were quite varied. 
In this paper, we explore a new perspective by presenting an innovative bi-objective 
optimization model which combines classic optimization theory and complex network theory 
to solve a sensor placement problem. This modeling approach is illustrated in the following. 
 
3.1.1. Objective functions 
As mentioned earlier, different objective functions have been adopted in the current literature 
on sensor location optimization. Here, we adopt the widely used concept of coverage in the 
WDN as our first objective function 1F : node “i” in the WDN is covered if a contamination 
event at node i can be detected by any of the sensors within time T, after the event has 
occurred. We refer to time T as the ‘‘coverage time”. For coverage maximization, we actually 
minimize the number of nodes which are not covered in all considered scenarios. Then, our 
objective function can be defined as: 
1
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In equation (2), decision variable yis is 1 if node i is not covered under scenario s, otherwise it 
is 0; i, I are the index and set of potential contamination source nodes, respectively; N is the 
total number of nodes in the network; s, S are the index and set of scenarios, respectively, and 
N(N-1) is a constant which is used to normalize the objective function. If it is not utilized, the 
second function does not affect the solutions. 
As second objective function F2, we adopt a complex network metric, specifically the 
Average Node Coverage (ANC) introduced [52] as a new network diffusion speed metric 
describing how fast information (or entities) are distributed from a node (center) to other 
nodes (periphery). It computes the average number of nodes that receive information (or 
entities) in one time unit, given that all connected nodes receive information (or entities) and 
it takes one time unit for a node to pass information to all its directly connected nodes. Thus, 
F2 is defined as: 
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In equation (3), decision variable zj is 1 if a sensor is located at node j and 0 otherwise; j, J 
are the index and set of potential sensor location nodes, respectively; the component size, 
CS(zj), is the number of nodes in the component that contain node zj; ( ) 1jCS z   is the 
number of nodes that are connected to node zj; ( )jLGD z  is the largest geodesic distance of 
the component which node zj belongs to; then, 
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measures the average number of nodes that receive the information (or entities) originated 
from zj , in one time unit. Because contamination diffusion speed in water distribution 
network through nodes that are connected to each other directly is important, this metric can 
be used to identify suitable sensor locations to detect contaminants in water distribution 
networks as early as possible. It is expected that the optimal solution of this objective 
function allows covering a maximum fraction of WDN nodes [52]. 
The criticality of nodes in a water distribution network is partially a function of the node type 
and associated hydraulic attributes, such as outflow, total demand, and hydraulic head. In this 
paper, for normalization of the second objective function F2 we use the “node-adjusted 
entropic degree” measure [29]. This measure uses a dimensionless weighting factor to 
incorporate the nodal base demand for water in the definition of entropic degree. In other 
words, this factor adjusts the entropic degree by weighting it by the relative demand for water 
at each node [29]. Demand-adjusted entropic degree of node i is defined as, 
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where gi is the entropic degree of node i, defined as, 
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and di is the base (nominal) demand for water at node i (in liters per second) and Md is the 
maximum of all such base demand values of the network nodes; pik is the normalized weight 
of the link between nodes i and k, with the property of 1ik
k
p   and defined as ikik
ik
k
w
p
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where wik is the physical capacity of a pipe between nodes i and k, defined as 
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where Lik is the pipe length and Dik is the pipe diameter between nodes i and k [29]. 
Thus, with equations (2) and (3) we have completed the building of our two objective 
functions. Note, that the coverage from a complex network perspective defined in (3) 
conflicts with the coverage considered in classical sense as defined in equation (2), as will be 
further shown in our case study of Section 4. 
 
3.1.2. Constraints 
We consider the following two constraints, originally proposed in Xu et al. [39]: 
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Constraint (4) specifies the number of available sensors and p is the total number of available 
sensors (for our calculations, we assume p=5). Constraint (5) stipulates that node i is either 
covered by the sensors ( 1
is
j
j N
z

 ) or uncovered ( 1isy  ), under the possible scenarios of 
contamination. Since the first objective F1 is to minimize the number of nodes uncovered, yis 
is forced to be 0 whenever 1
is
j
j N
z

 . Under this constraint, Nis = {j: tijs ≤ T} is the set of 
candidate sensor-location nodes that can detect a contamination event occurring at node i 
within time T under scenario s, tijs is the contaminant travel time from contamination source 
node i to potential sensor location node j under scenario s and T is the ‘‘coverage time”, i.e., 
the maximum allowable time from the start of the contamination event to detection.
   0,1 , 0,1j isz y  are integrality constraints [39]. 
3.2. Solution Method 
For the solution of the bi-objective optimization problem, we adopt a weighting method 
whereby the objective functions are combined through a weight factor W: 
1 2(1 )MinF WF W F    (6) 
As the objectives are conflicting, we need to find the non-dominated or Pareto optimal 
frontier [51], by letting the value of W change to produce some of the non-dominated 
solutions. 
 
4. Case study 
We consider a WDN comprise of 129 nodes, one constant head source, two tanks, 168 pipes, 
two pumps, eight valves (Figure 3). This WDN has been provided by the organizers of the 
Battle of Water Sensor Networks (BWSN) in a scientific competition held in 2006 [5]. Given 
a set of boundary conditions, such as four variable water demand patterns, we use the 
EPANET hydraulic simulator [53] to analyze network physical properties such as the steady-
state pressure and obtain important output, such as  the water flow velocity which is 
necessary to assign covering nodes. A sample of the results is shown in Table 3. We use ikL
and jkD to estimate
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 Figure 3. A WDN layout (BWSN) with 126 nodes, 1 source, 2 tanks, 168 pipes, 2 pumps, 8 valves [5] 
Table 3. EPANET’s sample results for the WDN of Figure 3 
Link ID Start Node i End 
Node k 
Length (ft) 
Lik 
Diameter (in) 
Dik 
Velocity 
LINK-0 118 126 7401 20.453411 0.3 
LINK-1 17 0 359 7.999894 0.32 
LINK-2 0 2 324 7.999894 0.16 
LINK-3 3 4 697 7.99981 0.09 
LINK-6 5 4 574 7.999807 0.3 
LINK-7 5 6 238 7.999912 0.49 
LINK-8 6 7 502 8 0 
LINK-9 8 6 396 7.999894 0.51 
LINK-10 9 8 377 7.999894 0.32 
LINK-19 RESERVOIR-129 128 51 30 1.09 
LINK-72 29 TANK-130 242 24 0.25 
LINK-165 102 TANK-131 559 16 0.67 
PUMP-170 105 106 #N/A #N/A 0 
PUMP-172 109 110 #N/A #N/A 0 
VALVE-173 111 112 #N/A 6 0.03 
VALVE-180 125 126 #N/A 8 0 
 
The scenarios considered for the network analysis are taken from [39]. Simulation of random 
contamination events was conducted with distinct contamination events beginning every 5 
minutes for the first 24 hour, with each event lasting for 2 hours. A suite of 129 × 24 × 60/5 
contamination events was simulated for each of the 129 nodes in the network, yielding a total 
of 37,152 contamination events. In our analysis, we focus on accidental random 
contamination events rather than one intentional contamination event. We assume that the 
contamination event might occur at any node. For our purposes, one scenario is the injection 
at any of the nodes of the same amount of contaminant, at the same starting time and for the 
same duration. Thus, we have 24 × 60/5=288 scenarios, with each scenario starting every five 
minutes for the first 24 hours of the simulation [5]. 
Table 4. Sample computation of node weights in undirected WDN (Figure 3) 
Node ID Nodal Demand(di) gi fi Normalized fi 
JUNCTION-0 0.763534 153,730.59 77,162.21 0.01537 
JUNCTION-1 0 286,810.25 143,405.13 0.02857 
JUNCTION-2 0.83 94,329.38 47,362.74 0.00943 
JUNCTION-3 4.4 121,948.61 62,331.59 0.01242 
JUNCTION-4 3.836466 204,539.49 104,254.70 0.02077 
JUNCTION-5 3.529833 194,080.68 98,773.26 0.01968 
JUNCTION-6 1.85 83,280.85 42,030.15 0.00837 
JUNCTION-7 0 25,233.27 12,616.64 0.00251 
JUNCTION-8 1.54 50,545.37 25,469.58 0.00507 
JUNCTION-9 0 44,719.98 22,359.99 0.00445 
JUNCTION-10 0.341497 65,524.77 32,818.99 0.00654 
JUNCTION-129 Reservoir 36,049.78 1.00 0.00000 
JUNCTION-130 Tank 109,478.22 1.00 0.00000 
JUNCTION-131 Tank 112,393.62 1.00 0.00000 
 
5. Results and discussions 
In this section, we show how a maximum of p=5 sensors should be optimally placed in the 
129-node network to obtain maximum coverage under 288 contamination scenarios. General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) [54] was used to formulate and solve the optimization. 
In Table 4, we have provided a sample computation of node weights in undirected WDN. 
Note that 
153,730.59 0.763534
(1 ) (1 ) 77,162.21
2 2 197.663527
i i
i
d
g d
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M
      
The normalized value is estimated, then, as 77,162.21/5020313=0.01537, as indicated in 
Table 4 at row 2. 
 
In Table 5, we reveal the weighted objective function value F, based on different weight 
values. In this Table, “W” shows the range of weight under which the non-dominated solution 
does not change. For example for W=0.6 up to W=1.0, the weighted function “F” is equal to 
1.500. The “F1” and “F2” values of the first and second objective functions, in this case, are 
equal to F1=1.500, F2=-0.173, respectively. Then, “sensor location node ID” values for this 
weighting range are 6, 28, 33, 34 and 58. 
 
Table 5. Sensor nodes locations for different ranges of weight values 
 
Weight, W 
 
F 
 
F1 
 
F2 
 
sensor location node ID 
0.6-1 1.500 1.500 -0.173 6 82 33 33 82 
0.4-0.55 0.642 1.709 -0.425 82 82 33 33 112 
0.1-0.35 0.313 1.971 -0.580 82 82 33 33 112 
0-0.05 -0.453 1.971 -0.580 19 20 23 33 112 
 
 
Figure 4. Objective function values F, F1 and F2 versus weight changes.  
 
However, by changing the W values from 0.6 to 0.55, the solution changes as shown in the 
third row of Table 5. Figure 4 shows the changing values of the objective functions F, F1 and 
F2 for the weights assigned to every objective. Overall, by changing the weight values, we 
have found three different Pareto optimal solutions of sensor location. It might be possible to 
find more solutions by introducing finer resolution on W or adopting a different method such 
as the ɛ-constraint method [51]. Still, the fact that most nodes in the current solutions are 
common including 28, 33, 34 and 118 may indicates that we have obtained a rather stable 
solution set. 
We pick the most frequent sensor node locations from Table 5, which is 20, 28, 33, 34 and 
118, shown on the WDN topology of the BWSN in Figure 5. In this Figure, we have also 
shown the results for the single objective functions of F1 and F2, respectively optimized. 
 Figure 5. Optimal sensor node locations in the WDN network (BWSN), for the three cases of 
single-objective F1 , F2 and bi-objective F optimization 
 
If we divide the network into two layers calling them the inner side (the core) and the outer 
side (the periphery), then the results coming from the complex theory objective function F2 
are distributed mostly in the inner side of the network, i.e., 4 out of 5 sensors. On the 
contrary, if the classical objective function F1 is used, then 3 out of 5 sensors are placed on 
the outer side of the network. However, if bi-objective optimization is used, the sensor nodes 
are allocated both on the inner and outer sides.  
Both objectives functions F1 and F2 are aimed to cover as much as nodes as possible, 
although from a different point of view, thus targeting different layers of the network. 
Instead, the Pareto optimal sensor location by the bi-objective model includes both objective 
functions.  
Now, we turn our attention to adopt some of the metrics of complex network theory as 
described in Table 1 to define the distribution of sensor nodes. The nodes are selected based 
on the maximization of the degree, betweenness and closeness centrality [13], [14]. By 
considering three metrics we obtain the results reported in Table 6. For comparisons, we have 
also evaluated the values of F1, F2 and F , also reported in Table 6. 
Table 6. Sensor nodes locations distribution by using the complex network metrics 
Metrics F F1 F2 sensor location node ID 
Degree -0.061 2.880 -0.061 22 28 38 28 29 
Betweenness -0.277 2.880 -0.277 22 28 83 32 33 
Closeness -0.056 2.880 -0.056 23 28 83 83 32 
 As shown in Figure 6, we notice again that most sensors are located on the inner side of the 
network. 
 
Figure 6. Distribution of sensor node locations in a WDN network (BWSN) based on the 
maximization of degree, betweenness and closeness centrality 
We also compare our results with those obtained in 15 other works on the BWSN network, as 
shown in Figure 7. In this Figure, we show the sensor nodes locations obtained in the 
scientific competition (BWSN) in 2006 and reported in [5]. On the same Figure 7, we have 
interested two solution sets, namely one from Xu et al. [39] and the results obtained by our 
bi-objective optimization. 
 
Figure 7. WDN network (BWSN) and alternative sensor nodes location solutions. 
 
Xu et al. [39] have adopted three different models of minimax, minimax regret and 
deterministic model and produced four different solution sets given in Table 7. 
Table 7. Solution set obtained by Zu et al. [39] 
Approach Solution Set( sensor location node ID) 
Minimax approach 
a. [72,83,100,116,121] 
b. [74,83,100,116,121] 
Minimax regret approach [34,74,83,100,116] 
Determinstic model   [74,83,100,120,124] 
 
5.1. Performance of the new approach 
Rathi and Gupta [4] in their review in 2014 have mentioned that “ it can be observed from the 
reported literature that there is no consensus amongst researchers on the number and type of 
performance objectives to be considered and several other issues related to sensor location 
problem” (page 186). Results reported in Figure 7 and Table 7 also reinforce the lack of 
agreements on how the performance of a sensor placement should be measured. We consider 
the following two principles for performance measurement of laying out the sensors and 
based on them we show that the modeling approach developed in this paper performs better 
than the other models. 
First principle: Since a WDN is a geographically distributed network, so should be the 
sensors. By looking at Figure 7, we see that the 65 sensors locations proposed by 15 previous 
works (each one considering a maximum of 5 sensors) are not uniformly distributed. For 
example, around node 83 we see that 13 sensors are assigned, whereas at node 102 or 45 only 
a single sensor is assigned. In Figure 8, we have reproduced Figure 7 but added the five 
circles of the sensors which have been located by the new modeling approach. Though, the 
sensors are not located at the center of the circles, they cover almost all the geographical area 
of the WDN. 
Second principle: Since a WDN is a complex network, any sensor placement method should 
consider this characteristic. The sensor placements in Figure 6, which are based on pure 
complex network metrics like degree, betweenness and closeness centrality, favor inner side 
nodes. We tested this property once more in Figure 5, where we considered the complex-
based objective function F2. Again, when the complex-based measure is used, the sensors are 
mostly located in the inner side of the WDN, whereas by using the classical model they are 
mostly located at the periphery of the WDN. Finally, the results produced by our bi-objective 
optimization accommodate both principles outlined above.  
In addition, the WDN considered here has only one water source. It can be argued that a 
viable sensor placement solution should assign one sensor to this source node as it is the most 
important node for intentional (or terrorist) attacks: any contamination inflow here in the 
source node will distribute to the other nodes in the network. In our solution, one sensor is, 
indeed, reasonably, assigned to the source node, whereas it can be seen from Figure 7 that 
only 4 out of 15 models did so. 
 
Figure 8. Five circles covering the WDN 
6. Conclusions 
The goal of sensor placement in WDNs is to detect contamination of intentional and 
accidental events, and to ensure safe and quality drinking water for consumers. Solving this 
problem as a classical optimization problem has been the focus of attention for many years.  
Models with single and multiple objectives have been formulated, and techniques such as 
integer and mixed-integer programming, stochastic programming, robust optimization, 
branch and bound, heuristics and meta-heuristics such as greedy and genetic algorithms have 
been applied. The original contribution of this paper is to present a new modeling approach 
by taking into consideration the fact that a WDN is a complex network. Thus, the structural 
and dynamical complexity properties should play a role in our sensor placement problem. 
Hence, we model the sensor placement problem within the complex network theory 
paradigm, and propose an integrated approach using both the classical and complex network 
perspective. 
For practical reference, we have considered a well-known water network, with 129 nodes 
and 178 links to show the working logic of our new approach. The test bed we adopted is a 
WDN previously considered for the sensor location problem, by about 20 other research 
groups. This was helpful to present a meaningful platform for comparison of the results 
across a wide range of approaches adopted by researchers in the field. 
The advantages of the new integrated approach proposed have turned out to be: 1) likewise 
the literature, we have formulated the sensor placement problem as a multi-objective 
optimization problem; 2) unlike in the literature, our approach is based on the fact that a 
WDN is a complex network; 3) our results reasonably match the results of others; 4) still our 
results improve the results of others, from the view point of complex network properties. 
The next step in the research is to formulate and solve a sensor placement problem in WDNs 
as a many-objective optimization problem, since there is no consensus amongst researchers 
on what objectives should be considered, like minimizing the detection time, the volume of 
contaminated water, the exposed population to contamination, the number of failed 
detections, the probability of failed detection, the sensor response time, the number of 
sensors, the discrepancy between residential and industrial consumption patterns, the 
discrepancy between time patterns, the discrepancy between intentional and accidental 
attacks. Also, it is equally important to maximize the coverage, the sensor detection 
likelihood and the sensor detection redundancy. How to consider many of these in an 
effective optimization framework and how to eventually take final location solutions is an 
interesting issue to address. 
A second line of further research is to include the complex network properties of a WDN into 
the structure of the constraints of the optimization problem, thus leading to a full integration 
of the complex network theory and the many-objective optimization theory. 
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